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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4246 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH MEDINA BAUTISTA, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A043-097-337) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 22, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 24, 2015 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Joseph Medina Bautista petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
 Bautista, a native and citizen of the Philippines, entered the United States in 1991 
as a conditional resident and became a lawful permanent resident in 1994.  In 2010, he 
pleaded guilty to distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute more 
than one ounce of methamphetamine, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 35-5(a)(1) and 
(b)(8), and distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of school property, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.  
§ 2C: 35-7.  Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 208.1  He was sentenced to five years of 
probation.  In 2014, the Government started removal proceedings on aggravated felony 
and controlled substance grounds.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i). 
  Bautista appeared pro se and contested removability, arguing that he had been 
wrongfully convicted.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that his convictions 
qualified as controlled substance offenses and aggravated felonies and that Medina was 
removable as charged.  The IJ also determined that Bautista was not eligible for any form 
of relief from removal.  His aggravated felony conviction rendered him statutorily 
ineligible for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, see 8 U.S.C.  
§§ 1229b(a)(3), 1229c(a)(1); he could not claim derivative citizenship through his mother 
                                              
1 There was a discrepancy in the state court documents regarding one of the 
convictions, i.e., the judgment of conviction listed the offense as involving less than an 
ounce of heroin or cocaine, rather than more than an ounce of methamphetamine.  The 
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because he was an adult when she became a naturalized citizen; and he presented no case 
for asylum or related relief because he testified that he had not been persecuted or 
tortured in the Philippines and did not fear such harm upon return.  Finally, the IJ denied 
Bautista’s request for a continuance to allow for the adjudication in state court of his 
pending petition for post-conviction relief because the matter was collateral to the 
immigration proceedings and its outcome was speculative. 
 On appeal, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and addressed an additional issue:  
whether the IJ should have allowed expert testimony that Bautista possessed only a 
“personal use” amount of drugs, making him eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The BIA noted that this argument was unfounded because the 
waiver is available only in cases involving a “single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marijuana,” id., whereas Medina was convicted of possession with intent 
to distribute more than an ounce of methamphetamine.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, 
and this petition for review followed. 
  Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal issued 
against aliens who, like Bautista, are removable for having been convicted of certain  
controlled substance offenses or an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we 
retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C.  
                                                                                                                                                  
judgment was later amended and submitted to the immigration court. 
 4 
 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  In his informal brief, which is quite spare, Bautista appears to raise the 
following issues:  (1) that the IJ should have made him aware of the option for a hearing 
pursuant to In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999); (2) that his judgment of 
conviction is unclear; and (3) that he was deprived of his due process rights.  To the 
extent that the first issue may be construed to involve a question of law, we lack 
jurisdiction to review it because it was not raised before the BIA and is thus not 
exhausted.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003).  As for 
the third issue, Bautista does not explain in his brief how his due process rights were 
violated.  To the extent he intended to raise the IJ’s denial of a continuance, that decision 
is discretionary and thus outside the bounds of our jurisdiction as delineated in 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  See Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2013).2 
 Turning to the remaining issue in the informal brief, Bautista states that “the 
conviction they are using to sentence me is not clear[;] the judgment of conviction does 
not indicate what my final conviction is.”  Pet’r’s Br. at 1.  The Government construes 
this as merely questioning whether the state court records clearly show what offenses he 
was convicted of, which is a factual matter. Resp’t’s Br. at 18.  Thus, the Government 
argues that Bautista has waived the issue of whether his convictions constitute aggravated 
felonies because he failed to identify or argue it in his opening brief.  Id. at 17.  Although 
                                              
2 We also note that the pendency of Bautista’s collateral challenge did not affect the 
finality of his convictions for immigration purposes.  See Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 
535, 542 (3d Cir. 2014); Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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it is “well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening 
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal,” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2002), we note that the document construed as Bautista’s petition for review  
was captioned as, and included, a brief in support of his petition.  That brief, which is 
much more developed than the informal brief, contains an argument challenging whether 
the conviction for distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute more 
than one ounce of methamphetamine constitutes an aggravated felony.  Affording 
Bautista the liberal construction due pro se pleadings, see Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 
333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2011), we do not consider him to have waived this issue by failing 
to include it in his informal brief because it was presented in his petition for review. 
 Bautista’s argument appears to be that his conviction is not an aggravated felony 
because it is akin to a simple possession offense.  That argument is neither factually nor 
legally viable in this case.  Bautista was convicted of violating (1) N.J. Stat. Ann.  
§ 2C: 35-5(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to “manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to 
possess or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a 
controlled dangerous substance,” and (2) § 2C:35-5(b)(8), which specifies that a violation 
of section 5(a)(1) involving more than five ounces of methamphetamine is a crime of the 
first degree.  A state offense constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration purposes 
only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act 
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(i.e., imprisonment of more than a year).  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 
1683 (2013).  The statute Bautista was convicted under “proscribes the identical conduct” 
as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful “to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance.”  Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003).  Although the general 
New Jersey statute is not categorically an aggravated felony because it also includes 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and distribution of a “small amount” of 
marijuana for no remuneration is only a federal misdemeanor, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4), 
that exception is not at issue here.  Bautista was convicted of the subsection of the New 
Jersey statute dealing with methamphetamine, not marijuana.  Methamphetamine is a 
controlled substance, see 21 U.S.C. § 812, the distribution of which is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment of more than a year.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).  Thus, Bautista’s 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.3 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition. 
                                              
3 Bautista also raised in his petition for review the issues of his eligibility for 
cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  He is 
statutorily ineligible for both, as explained earlier in this opinion and the BIA’s decision. 
